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We use a modified gravity model to estimate the relationship between trade and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). We 
find evidence of a significant causal relationship from SADC’s exports to inward FDI. 
Distance (reflecting remoteness and transport costs) and political instability are 
confirmed to be significant determinants of FDI to SADC. We discern differences in the 
patterns and determinants of FDI to SADC, whether it is from the USA and UK or from 
continental Europe. In the case of FDI to SADC from the USA and UK, it is exports 
from SADC to these countries that are significant, and not imports, while, in the case of 
continental Europe, both exports and imports are significantly associated with FDI to 
SADC. 
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Introduction 
The growing trend towards globalization and regionalization of economies has led to the 
increased importance of international capital flows. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
become a major source of capital flows in many developing nations. The study of the 
impacts, causes, and economic relationships of FDI has gained in popularity in the last 
decade (Naudé and Krugell 2007). There is substantial agreement that FDI can 
contribute to economic growth and can result in technology transfers to developing 
countries (Asiedu 2001; Borenstein et al. 1998; Lim 2001; Naudé and Krugell 2007). 
In Africa, the potential contribution that FDI can make is significant. The New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative determined that Africa 
requires about US$64 billion annually in capital to be able to generate the growth of 7 
per cent per annum that is needed to achieve the millennium development goals 
(MDGs). Historically, Africa is the region in the world most marginalized in terms of 
attracting FDI. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) only attracted an average of US$7 billion 
annually from 1995 to 2001 (US$2.9 billion if Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa are 
excluded). This amounts to an average of only 1.5 per cent of total world FDI (Asiedu 
2004a; UNCTAD 2005b).  
Africa’s failure to attract sufficient inflows of FDI is undoubtedly because it is a high risk 
environment for private capital, due to various institutional and geographical features 
(Asiedu 2006; Naudé and Krugell 2007), as well as various ‘anti-growth policy 
syndromes’ that have depressed investment (Fosu and O’Connell 2006). In the recent 
past, an increasing number of African countries have embarked on economic reform 
programmes and initiatives to address these negative features of the policy and 
institutional environment. Perhaps the most important of these measures are aimed at 
trade reform, and both unilateral as well as multilateral initiatives have been taken to 
liberalize trade (Owhoso et al. 2002: 408). The expectation is that trade liberalization will 
improve the openness of African economies, with benefits to growth coming from more 
trade (rising exports and the ability to acquire imported inputs for manufacturing 
production) and FDI (Morriset 2000). In particular, the belief exists that more trade due to 
trade liberalization will have a determining and positive complementary impact on FDI.1 
Greenaway et al. (2007: 206) claim that ‘the more open is the trade policy the greater is 
the economy’s gravitational attraction to foreign capital’. They also find evidence from a 
sample of 77 developing countries over the period 1990–2000 that FDI contributes to 
growth in open economies, but not closed ones (Greenaway et al. 2007: 208). 
In this paper, we investigate the empirical evidence on the link between trade and FDI in 
Africa. We do so focusing on the Southern African Developing Community (SADC),2 a 
                                                 
1   Indeed, despite Africa’s poor historical record in terms of attracting FDI, there has been relatively 
good progress over the past decade or so, with the FDI stock in Africa rising from US$26 billion in 
1990 to US$187 billion in 2005, with Africa’s share of FDI to developing countries increasing from 
4.7 per cent to 6.3 per cent over the same period (UNCTAD 2006a). 
2   SADC, established in 1992, consists of 14 countries, including Angola, Botswana, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. South Africa alone accounts for 
more than 75 per cent of SADC’s total GDP.   2
multilateral trade initiative, rather than on single countries or on the cross-African case. 
The reasons for this are twofold. First, SADC represents the most developed region of 
SSA and is economically the largest contributor to the African economy (SADC 2006). 
Its relative large (in the African context) internal market can be seen as offering a growing 
market for foreign investors, as well as a ‘springboard’ for trade with the rest of SSA 
(Owhoso et al. 2002: 412).3 The SADC aims to establish a Customs Union by 2010. 
Given the potential for trade diversion due to the relatively large size of one dominant 
economy (South Africa) (Carrère 2004; Sandrey 2006), understanding the potential 
impact of trade on FDI might be important for the way in which regional integration is 
managed. Second, regional integration has been increasing throughout the developing 
world in recent times (Baldwin 2006). The pertinent question is: Will the resulting 
growing intra- and inter-regional trade contribute to more FDI? The evidence from SADC 
could be instructive to other countries and groupings considering trade liberalization and 
regional integration as strategies to obtain greater FDI. 
In the next section, a brief review of the recent literature on FDI and its determinants in 
Africa is given, with an emphasis on recent discussions on the relationship between 
trade and FDI. The subsequent section sets out the methodology (an adapted gravity 
model based on Bos and Van de Laar (2004) and Borrmann et al. (2005)), including a 
discussion of the data used. The paper goes on to present the results of the empirical 
study and then offers concluding remarks. 
The recent literature 
In this section, we discuss the recent literature on the relationship between trade and 
FDI, and summarize the findings from recent studies on the determinants and effects of 
FDI in Africa. We point out that, although important progress has been made in 
understanding the reasons for the low levels and growth of FDI to Africa, the recent 
literature has not dealt adequately with the relationship between trade and FDI in Africa. 
The relationship between trade and FDI has recently been the subject of some scrutiny 
in the literature. Mekki (2005) pointed out that the reason for this increasing scrutiny is 
due to the fact that, traditionally, theories of FDI and trade have different origins and 
aims. Trade theory tries to explain why countries trade with one another whereas FDI 
theory tries to explain why firms produce abroad and invest in particular countries. As a 
consequence, various studies have attempted to integrate FDI into trade theory; for 
example, Brainard (1993), Dunning (1981), Eaton and Tamura (1994), Fontagné and 
Pajot (1997), Helpman (1984), Helpman and Krugman (1985), Horstmann and 
Markusen (1992), Markusen (1983, 1995), and Markusen and Venables (1995). These 
studies have concluded that, one the one hand, FDI generates complementary trade 
flows of finished goods, while, on the other hand, they suggested that FDI and trade can 
act as substitutes for finished goods but be complementary for intermediate goods 
(Blonigen 2001; Head and Ries 2001; Swenson 2004). Empirical evidence from Tunisia 
finds that FDI inflows and trade are indeed complementary for the manufacturing 
sectors of the economy, but are substitutes for some primary sectors (Mekki 2005). 
                                                 
3   It can also be mentioned that the economic literature on SADC as a regional free trade area is 
relatively small as compared to the much larger economic literature on the West and Central African 
CFA ‘Franc’ zones.    3
Other empirical studies found that where FDI takes place in the production of a specific 
good, exports in the same good declined, but exports for intermediate goods used in the 
production process of the same product rose significantly (Blonigen 2005; Head and 
Ries 2001; Swenson 2004). 
A number of studies also find empirical evidence that FDI and trade are correlated. 
Jensen (2002) finds that FDI inflows have a positive influence on the technological base 
of Polish exports. Alguacil and Orts (2002) find a positive relationship between FDI 
outflows and exports from Spain. Pontes (2004) concludes that, for high levels of trade 
costs, FDI and trade act as complements and otherwise as substitutes. The OECD 
(2002) finds that, among their member countries, FDI levels are strongly correlated with 
trade and trade openness. However, they only treat FDI as a determinant of trade. The 
OECD (2005) confirms that the long trend among OECD member states is that FDI is 
becoming more trade intensive as a result of MNEs establishing global production 
networks and business-to-business value chains. The World Bank (2004) finds that, in 
general, Asian FDI inflows are increasingly affected by openness to trade and flows to 
export orientated economies. Fontangé and Pajot (1997) find that, for France, Sweden, 
the USA, EU, and Japan, the traditional trade theory of FDI acting as a substitute does 
not hold and that trade and FDI mostly act as complements. Repkine and Walsh (1998) 
examine the industrial output of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania during the 
first six years of the post communist era. They found that FDI induced vertical waves of 
EU orientated output where non-EU output mostly collapsed.  
Jun and Singh (1996) argues for bi-directional causality between FDI inflows and 
exports for developing countries. They conclude that greater export orientation will 
attract more FDI. Liu et al. (2002) finds empirical bi-directional causality between 
growth, FDI inflows, and trade in China but only one-way causality to imports. 
Aizenman and Noy (2005) apply various statistical techniques and find strong bi-
directional linkages between FDI flows and trade on an international level, 
differentiating only between developed and developing countries. 
In conclusion it can be said that no clear conclusion is reached on the complementary or 
substitutionary link between trade and FDI. The literature indicates that the linkage is 
dependent on the specific case. 
As far as SSA is concerned, there have been comparatively few studies on FDI, leading 
Owhoso  et al.  (2002: 408) to note that ‘the African continent has been ignored in 
academic studies of FDI’. Although this somewhat of a strong statement (there is a 
small, but increasing literature on FDI in Africa—see Table 1), it is the case that, with a 
single exception, not one of the existing studies considered the relationship between 
trade and FDI in Africa.4 
 
 
                                                 
4   Most studies of FDI in Africa focus on the determinants of FDI to Africa (Ng 2007: 5).    4
Table 1 Recent FDI studies on Africa 
Authors  Description of main findings/focus  
Asiedu (2002)  The marginal benefit from increased openness to trade is less successful for sub-
Saharan Africa. Africa is therefore different and policies that proved successful 
elsewhere might not be equally successful in Africa. 
Asiedu (2004a)  Sub-Saharan Africa has attracted more FDI due to policy reforms, but has a declining 
share of global FDI. 
Asiedu (2004b)  In order to realize the employment benefits of FDI, sub-Saharan Africa needs to 
attract FDI in non-natural resource industries and host countries need to improve their 
infrastructure and human capital stocks. 
Asiedu (2006)  From a study using panel data for 22 African countries, finds that natural resources 
and a large domestic market are important determinants of FDI, and that 
macroeconomic policies are also significant. 
Basu and Srinivasan 
(2002) 
Studies the determinants of FDI in Africa and argue that these can be classified 
according to four categories: natural resources, specific locational advantages, 
policies towards FDI, and economic reforms. 
Goldstein (2004)  Political instability (high perceived risk) is a key limitation on FDI to Southern 
Africa, despite the region’s potential.  
Jenkins and Thomas 
(2002) 
Africa’s negative international image of political and economic instability has a 
severe impact on the whole continent and a concerted effort to improve stability will 
also improve FDI inflows. 
Mhlanga (2007)  The determinants of FDI to SADC are studied using project-level data. It is found that 
market size, colonial ties, and proximity of the investing country are the major 
determinants of FDI to SADC.  
Morisset (2000)  Countries with attractive investment environments were able to attract a significant 
share of FDI. Therefore, aggressive liberalization and strong economic growth will 
lead to an increased level of FDI. 
Naudé and Krugell 
(2007)  
Geography does not have a direct influence on FDI flows to Africa and neither 
market-seeking nor resource-seeking FDI seems to dominate. Political stability 
proved to be a significant determinant of FDI, which indicates that good institutions 
are important. 
Ng (2007)  Studies the link between FDI and productivity in 14 SSA countries and finds only 
limited evidence that FDI inflows contribute to higher productivity in Africa. 
Seetanah and 
Khadaroo (2007) 
Investigate the relationship between FDI and growth in the case of 39 African 
countries over the period 1980–2000. They find that FDI has a positive and 
significant effect on growth. However, the contribution of FDI to growth is less than 
that of domestic private and public investment, and also less than in non-African 
countries. 
Te Velde (2002)   Two issues of concern regarding FDI and Africa are (a) that SSA attracts only a small 
share of total FDI flows; and (b) that it is hotly debated whether FDI really leads to 
economic and social development in Africa. The focus is on what host countries can 
do to influence FDI. 
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Some key publications to have focused on FDI in Africa in recent times are summarized 
in Table 1. From Table 1, it can be seen that the recent literature on FDI in Africa point 
to the need in African countries for improvements in human capital, infrastructure, 
political stability and appropriate macro-economic policies.  
These studies on FDI to Africa omitted to take into consideration the possible 
relationship between FDI and trade, the exception being Asiedu (2002) who found that 
the marginal benefit to FDI from increased openness to trade is not significant for SSA. 
Apart from this finding, however, it would appear that the relationship between trade 
and FDI is not well understood in Africa. As has been pointed out, greater openness to 
trade and rising trade could lead to higher inflows of FDI. For Africa, such a 
relationship could be important in view of (i) African economies’ greater openness to 
trade, following more and more countries’ adoption of trade liberalization programmes 
and regional integration schemes; and (ii) the greater desire amongst African countries 
to further regional integration and trade (as seen, for instance, in objectives of the 
African Union, NEPAD and regional trade agreements such as SADC). 
Methodology 
Modelling approach 
We use an adapted gravity model (Bos and Van de Laar 2004). It is derived from 
Newton’s gravity equation that holds that the gravitational pull between two objects is 
directly and positively related to their mass and the distance between the objects acting 
as a restraint (Borrmann et al. 2005).  
The application in economics implies that an economic flow between two economic 
entities will depend on their respective economic sizes and the distance between them. 
Distance can be represented as physical distance, or a psychological restraint or 
encouragement to do business (Borrmann et al. 2005). For FDI, it can also be stated that 
gravity, in general, refers to the forces that work to bring actual FDI flows in line with 
expected FDI flows (Bos and Van de Laar 2004).  
The general gravity formula states that the attractive force between objects i and j can 






G F =  (1) 
where:  
•  Fij is the attractive force 
•  Mi and Mj are the masses 
•  Dij is the distance between the two objects 
•  G is a gravitational constant. 
If these principles are applied in order to explain FDI in terms of trade it can be written 





A FDI =  (2) 
where: 
•  FDIij is the flow in FDI from home country i to host country j 
•  Xi and Xj are the respective export totals of i and j 
•  Distij is the distance between home country i to host country j 
•  Aij is a constant. 
When transformed into a linear equation using logs, it can be written as follows: 
ij ij j i ij Dist X X FDI ε β β β β + − + + = ln ln ln ln 3 2 1 0  (3) 
(With  0 β  a simple constant,  ij ε  the error term,  1 β  and  2 β  are positive.) 
The coefficient for the distance term need not be negative. The outcome is reflected in 
whether distance is a deterrent for FDI or a magnet. Distij  represents a vector of 
variables that represent distance. Theory will also dictate that, in the case of resource 
seeking FDI, the imports of the home country will determine FDI rather than exports.  
During the estimation process, three models are investigated. Each model builds upon, 
and is an extension of, the previous one. The strategy entails, first, modelling data at an 
aggregate level and then gradually expanding the model to include individual home and 
host countries. The first model, Model 1 (covering 1973–2004), a single equation 
regression, serves as a preliminary investigation into the data and is done at an 
aggregate level. In Model 2 (covering 1974–2004), Model 1 is expanded to include the 
export totals of the major trading partners of SADC as separate variables. Model 2 is 
also a single equation regression. Both Models 1 and 2 give an indication as to the 
viability and validity of using the adapted gravity approach. With positive results in the 
first two models, a panel regression is carried out for the SADC countries and their most 
important trading partners in Model 3 (covering 1989–2004). A Granger causality test is 
also carried out on the stacked FDI inflow and SADC export variables. 
Variables and data 
The variables and data used in Models 1–3 are described in Table 2. 
Other variables were also tested but proved not to be significant. They included the 
Transparency international corruption perception index (Transparency International 
2006); the World Bank good governance indicators (World Bank 2006a); trade 
balances, current account balances, various trade variables, tourist arrivals, number of 
commodities traded on debts owed from the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 
(UNCTAD 2006b); IMF exchange rates (IMF 2006); and internet connectivity figures 
from the World Bank development indicators (World Bank 2006b). 
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Table 2 List of variables used in final estimations 
Variables used  Description  Source 
Model 1 
SADCFDI  Total FDI inflows to SADC  UNCTAD FDI online: 
www.unctad.org (UNCTAD 
2006a) 
SADCExports   Total trade exports of SADC to the 
developed world 
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics: 
www.unctad.org (UNCTAD 
2006b) 
MajorExports   Total trade of the major developed 
countries to the rest of the world 
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics: 
www.unctad.org (UNCTAD 
2006b) 
MajorExportstoAfrica   Total trade of the major developed 
countries to Africa 
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics: 
www.unctad.org (UNCTAD 
2006b) 
Distance   Distance from South Africa to the UK is 
used because in the aggregate data single 
equation distance is a constant. 
Distances were calculated with 
the www.infoseek.com distance 
calculator. It uses coordinates 
from the US Geological survey to 
calculate distance between two 
points on the world globe. 
Dummy90   Dummy variable with values of 1 in 1979, 
1985, 1990, and 1994; otherwise 0. These 
years were years in which SADC 
experienced political turmoil.  
Own calculations 
Model 2 
SADCFDI    Total FDI inflows to SADC  UNCTAD FDI online: 
www.unctad.org (UNCTAD 
2006a) 
SADCExports  Total trade exports of SADC to the 
developed world 





Total trade of the major individual trading 
partners (the USA, UK, and Japan) to 
Africa 
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics: 
www.unctad.org (UNCTAD 
2006b) 
Distance   Distance from South Africa to the UK is 
used because, in the aggregate data single 
equation, distance is a constant. 
Distances were calculated with 
the www.infoseek.com distance 
calculator. It uses coordinates 
from the US Geological survey to 
calculate distance between two 
points on the world globe. 
Model 3    
Dummy76 
 
Dummy variable with values of 1 in 1976, 
1979, 1985, 1990, and 1994; otherwise 0. 
These years were years in which SADC 
experienced political turmoil. 
Own calculations 
FDIinflows   Stacked variable of the FDI inflows to the 
respective SADC countries 
UNCTAD FDI online: 
www.unctad.org (UNCTAD 
2006a) 
ExportsSADC   Stacked variable of the value of 
merchandise exports of the respective 
SADC countries 
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics: 
www.unctad.org (UNCTAD 





Total trade of the individual trading 
partners to Africa 







A stacked variable of distance from the 
respective SADC countries to their 
individual trading partners the USA, UK, 
Germany, France, Italy, and Japan. 
Distances were calculated with 
the www.infoseek.com distance 
calculator. It uses coordinates 
from the US Geological survey to 
calculate distance between two 
points on the world globe. 
Dummypol   Stacked dummy variable that represents 
political instability and natural disasters in 
the respective SADC countries. 
Crudely constructed by using the 
brief historical overviews of the 
individual SADC countries and 
years of instability as given in the 
CIA Factbook (CIA 2006) and the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(Britannica 2006).  
 
The equations in Model 1 and Model 2 are estimated for aggregate SADC, while the 
panel in Model 3 contains the stacked data for individual SADC countries. SADC 
consists of Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (SADC 2006). Six more countries could conceivably 
be included in SADC, in the long term. They are Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, and Uganda. For the purposes of this paper, they are included as their trade 
and geographic locations are completely intertwined with SADC. FDIs from South 
Africa in other SADC countries are not taken into consideration. Although increasingly 
important for SADC, outward FDI from South Africa, China, and India in Africa is a 
relatively recent phenomenon (Henley et al. 2007: 6). The scope of the study covers 
1989 to 2004 and thus the relationship with these countries cannot as yet be adequately 
empirically investigated. 
For Model 3 distance is calculated from the individual SADC countries’ capitals to the 
trading partners’ capitals. 
Empirical results 
In this section, the results of the empirical analysis are presented, discussed and 
interpreted. The results were obtained as outlined in the previous section and consist of 
the individual results of the three specified models. 
Model 1 
Table 3 shows the final results of Model 1. Total exports of the developed world are 
limited to their exports to Africa only. A dummy variable (Dummy90) is introduced. 
Dummy90 is 0 except for 1979, 1985, 1990, and 1994, where it is 1. These years were 
of great consequence for the SADC region, as they represent (i) the end of the 
Rhodesian conflict in 1979; (ii) the debt freeze of South Africa in 1985; (iii) significant 
political changes announced in South Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Kenya in   9
1990; and the changes in South Africa in 1994. It explains why the variable is 
significant at the 5 per cent level. The explanatory variables are ‘lagged’ for one period 
and finally an AR(2) term proves to be highly significant at the 5 and 1 per cent levels. 
All these changes bring about significant change in the estimation results. The ‘Total 
exports of the developed world’ variable is the only variable that is insignificant even at 
the 10 per cent level. 
Table 3 Model 1 results 
Dependent variable: LOG(SADCFDI) 
Method: Least squares (sample: 1973–2004) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic  Prob.     
LOG(SADCExports(Lag1)) 3.972  5.064  0.000* 
LOG(ExportstoAfrica(Lag1)) -1.353  -1.482  0.151 
LOG(Distance) -1.867  -2.023  0.053* 
Dummy90 -0.543  -2.486  0.020* 





Akaike info criterion  2.043 
Schwarz criterion  2.276 
Durbin–Watson stat.  1.604 
 
Because Model 1 is a preliminary investigation, no further investigation or a more in-
depth statistical analysis is carried out. The fact that the SADC export variable is 
significant at the 1 per cent level, and the distance variable is also significant at the 10 
per cent level, clearly indicates that relationships as set out in the adapted gravity model 
do exist within the data. This warrants further investigation. 
Model 2 
In Table 4, the results are shown for Model 2. Total export of the trading partners is 
limited to exports to Africa only, as suggested by Model 1. A dummy variable that is an 
expansion of dumm1990 from Model 1 is also included. The years of 1977 and 1983 are 
added as having a value of 1 to 1979, 1985, 1990, and 1994 to take into account (i) the 
Angolan and Rhodesian conflicts of 1977; (ii) the aftermath of the Soweto riots of 1976; 
and (iii) the severe droughts and food shortages that occurred in the region in 1983. All 
variables except EU exports and distance, which once again form the constant term, are 
significant at the 1 per cent level. Due some missing values, the sample size is reduced 
to 1974 to 2004.   10
Table 4 Model results  
Dependent variable: LOG(SADCFDI) 
Method: Least squares (sample: 1974–2004) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic  Prob.     
LOG(SADCExports) 2.702  7.601  0.000* 
LOG(USexports) 3.096  5.531  0.000* 
LOG(UKexports) -2.402  -2.541  0.018* 
LOG(Japanexports) -2.483  -6.502  0.000* 
LOG(Distance) 0.056  0.179  0.860 





Akaike info criterion  0.528* 
Schwarz criterion  0.808* 
Durbin–Watson stat  1.607 
 
All test results indicate a satisfactory fit but, due to fears of multicollinearity and unit 
roots, further investigation into the accuracy of the equation is needed. The total exports 
variables are all subject to concurrent global economic trends and could lead to 
multicollinearity, and also unit roots in the residuals, that could bias the estimation 
results. Table 5 gives the test results for the model and its residuals. It should be noted 
that all tests confirm a good fit. 
Model 2 finds a statistically significant relationship between FDI inflows to SADC and 
trade. Specifically, the results show that a complementary relationship exists between 
exports from SADC and FDI, and between imports from the USA (USExports) and FDI 
to SADC. The negative coefficients on LOG(UKexports) and LOG(Japanexports) 
would suggest, at this stage, substitution between SADC imports from these countries 
and FDI inflows. Political instability in 1976 appears to be significant and has a 
negative impact on FDI inflows. In Table 4, the coefficient on the distance variable is, 
however—contrary to expectations—insignificant.  
As mentioned in previous sections, there are some questions as to whether trade causes 
FDI or whether FDI causes trade. Most evidence for developed countries suggests that 
FDI causes trade, with little FDI being caused by trade. Therefore, it is pertinent to 
examine the causality between trade and FDI in SADC before doing the panel 
estimations. Table 6 shows the results of a Granger causality test that was done on the 
stacked series of FDI inflows to the individual SADC countries and the stacked value of 
merchandise exports. The test was repeated with various lagged options but always gave   11
the same result. The test indicates that, in the specific case of the 20 countries included 
in the analysis, exports from SADC (Granger) cause FDI to SADC. 
 
Table 5 Model 2: regression diagnostics  
Summary of test results 
Ramsey RESET test:  F-statistic  0.048 
  Log likelihood ratio  0.063 
White heteroskedasticity test:  F-statistic  0.912 
 Obs*R
2 20.085 
Breusch–Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test:  F-statistic  0.062 
 Obs*R
2 0.168 
ARCH test:  F-statistic  0.893 
 Obs*R
2 0.929 
Normality tests:  Jarque-Bera 0.781 
 Jarque-Bera  probability  0.677 
 Skewness  0.080 
 Kurtosis  2.226 
Unit root tests:  Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  -4.844 
  Augmented Dickey-Fuller test probability  0.001 
  Phillips-Perron test statistic  -4.844 
  Phillips-Perron test probability  0.001 
Forecast tests:  Mean Absolute Error  0.268 
  Mean Absolute Percentage Error  4.360 
 
Table 6 Causality test for FDI and exports in SADC  
Pairwise Granger causality tests                                               Sample: 1970–2005 
Lags: 1  Obs  523 
  Null hypothesis:  F-Statistic Probability
ExportsSADC does not Granger Cause FDIinflows  37.199  0.000 
FDIinflows does not Granger Cause ExportsSADC  1.530  0.217 
    
GDP does not Granger Cause FDIinflows  42.747  0.000 
FDIinflows does not Granger Cause GDP  14.946  0.000 
    
GDP does not Granger Cause ExportsSADC  15.4581  0.000 
ExportsSADC does not Granger Cause GDP  28.5061  0.000 
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Model 3 
Model 3 consists of six panel estimations using the gravity specification. Estimations 
were done for a different trading partner, while the panel represents the variables for the 
20 SADC countries. Table 7 shows the final estimation results for the panel estimations 
of the 20 SADC countries with the six major trading partners. 
In the case of the USA and UK, all variables are significant at the 1 per cent level 
except the total trade of the USA/UK with Africa. These are also the only two equations 
where the constant was significant. For France and Germany, all variables were 
significant at the 1 per cent level. For France, however, an AR (1) term was also 
significant. Italy mostly shares results with France and Germany but the total export of 
Italy variable is only just not significant at the 10 per cent level. In the equation for 
Japan, only the SADC exports and the political stability dummy variable are statistically 
significant. 
SADC exports are significant throughout the estimations and this confirms the result of 
the Granger causality test. It should be noted that the coefficient of SADC exports for 
all the estimations is nearly on a 1 to 1 basis. This implies that, for every 1 per cent 
increase in SADC exports, there is an almost 1 per cent increase in FDI. 
The large negative and mostly significant coefficients on distance and ‘Dummypol’ for 
most equations indicates, first, that the SADC countries are geographically very distant 
to their trading partners and that, second, perceived political instability matters for FDI. 
 
Table 7 Model 3 results  
Dependent variable: LOG(FDIinflows) 
Method: Panel GMM EGLS (cross-section weights) (sample: 1989–2004) 
Variable *USA  *UK  *Germany  *France  *Italy  *Japan 
Constant  58.59 (3.55)  36.67 (2.2)        
LOG(ExportsSADC)  0.88 (11.04)  0.96 (8.66)  0.91 (17.47)  0.88 (12.57) 0.92 (14.66)  0.91 (12.35) 
LOG(Export*)  -0.13 (-0.20)  -0.82 (-0.69) 1.12 (2.59)  1.36 (2.37)  0.93 (1.65)  -0.45 (-0.65) 
LOG(Distance*)  -6.21 (-4.26)  -3.45 (-3.67) -1.32 (-3.04)  -1.62 (-2.66) -1.16 (-2.04)  0.25 (0.38) 
Dummypol  -3.77 (-6.47)  -4.22 (-4.79) -3.39 (-11.96) -3.2 (-7.3)  -2.63 (-7.7)  -3.24 (-5.65) 
AR 1 Term  0.27 (3.63)  0.315 (4.27)   0.33 (6.14)  0.36 (5.11)  0.36 (5.09) 
Weighted statistics
R
2  0.599  0.453 0.625 0.720  0.854 0.712 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.591  0.443 0.621 0.716  0.852 0.707 
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.936  1.951 1.329 1.976  2.029 1.975 
J-statistic  0.076  0.000 6.584 3.032  3.382 0.618 
Unweighted statistics 
R
2  0.529  0.327 0.571 0.698  na  0.687 
Sum
2  Residual  696.427  976.573 632.501 463.594  na  481.931 
Durbin–Watson  stat.  1.859  1.869 1.232 1.977  na  1.951 
Note: t-statistic in parenthesis. 
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The overall measures of fit are mixed and fluctuate between rather mediocre fits for the 
USA and the UK to overall good fits for Germany, France, and Italy. Panel unit root 
tests indicate that no unit root is present but normality tests indicate that normality 
cannot be assumed for the residuals. This is attributed to the severe fluctuations in the 
data, which coincides with periods of political instability. 
In periods of substantial fluctuations, there is possible over-or-under estimation of the 
actual value. This is more significant for the figures of Burundi than for the other 
countries. This problem could be addressed by amending the dummy variable. It is, 
however, not advisable because the fluctuations should be seen as the inability of the 
gravity specification to capture all the relevant variables that explain FDI inflows or the 
inability of a dummy variable to explain the effects of political instability completely. 
Other variables outside the scope of the gravity specification might be effective in 
explaining the fluctuation observed in the residuals. Country specific evaluation might 
deliver other results because they are not obtained as the overall error that includes the 
joint series of country residuals. In future research, the specification can be opened up to 
include other variables that might explain the fluctuations more clearly. In a country 
specific evaluation, other results might also be obtained. Both of these suggestions fall 
outside the scope of this paper. 
The final conclusion from Table 7 is that the general trend in FDI inflows is 
significantly explained in the estimation by SADC exports, distance, and political 
instability. The insignificance of US, UK and Japanese exports to SADC suggests a 
possible lack of complementarities between SADC imports from, and FDI inflows from 
these countries, in contrast to the complementarities in both exports and imports to and 
from Germany, France, and Italy.  
Concluding remarks 
In a recent assessment of policies needed to lift African countries out of their poverty 
trap, Sachs et al. (2004: 150) placed a high priority on regional integration, stating that 
‘Regional integration will raise the interest of potential foreign investors by increasing 
the scope of the market.’ In this paper, we focused on the SADC and asked whether, in 
these countries, a relationship exists between trade and FDI. In so doing, the 
contribution of this paper was threefold. First, we contributed to the relatively small, but 
growing literature on FDI in Africa. Second, we contributed towards understanding the 
relationship between trade and FDI in Africa, which has so far been neglected in the 
literature. Third, our results are of interest to countries in Africa considering regional 
integration as a strategy to raise economic growth through greater openness to trade.  
Using an adapted gravity model, we found that there is indeed a significant causal and 
positive relationship between FDI inflows to SADC and SADC exports. Distance and 
political instability are also significant determinants with a negative relation to FDI. The 
export variables for home countries left mixed results with the USA, UK, and Japan 
having insignificant and negative coefficients. Germany, France, and Italy had positive 
significant coefficients but insignificant constant values. The results for these mainland 
European countries indicate a complementary role between home exports and host FDI 
inflows.   14
From these results the following policy recommendations can be made. First, trade 
liberalization remains important in Southern Africa for attracting more FDI through its 
beneficial impacts on exports from the region (Edwards and Alves 2006; Mengistae and 
Patillo 2004). Second, further regional integration within SADC needs to ensure that 
trade diversion losses from traditional trading partners such as the EU and the USA be 
minimized; however, given the general strong relationship between exports and FDI, 
further regional integration might increase the ‘proximity’ of countries to their export 
destination markets, especially in the case of the many landlocked countries in SADC. 
Indeed, this could also benefit landlocked countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, and 
Uganda, which are currently not members. Third, growing trade within SADC as a 
result of regional integration might lead to growing investment from South Africa in the 
region, given the country’s proximity to its other SADC partners. The country is already 
the third largest single investor in other SADC countries in dollar values (Mhlanga 
2007: 9). Finally, greater efforts will need to be made within SADC to limit the negative 
impacts and ‘neighbourhood effects’ that political instability can exert on FDI. The 
region’s apparent inability to contribute solutions to the ongoing crisis in Zimbabwe 
could ultimately be costing the whole region in terms of FDI. 
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